

EXHIBIT H

STATE OF ALASKA

THE REGULATORY COMMISSION OF ALASKA

Before Commissioners:

Kate Giard, Chair
Dave Harbour
Mark K. Johnson
James S. Strandberg
Anthony A. Price

In the Matter of the Commission Review of)
Rules and Regulations Governing) R-03-3
Telecommunications Rates, Charges Between)
Competing Telecommunications Companies, and)
Competition in Telecommunications)

GCI'S REPLY COMMENTS

I. Introduction

In accordance with Order R-03-3(11), dated April 8, 2005, initial comments on the proposed regulations issued in this matter were filed by AT&T Alascom¹, ACS², MTA³, the Rural Coalition, and GCI⁴. While some issues remain, all comments indicate a general consensus with the Commission's overall approach.

GCI hopes that the various reply comments will provide even greater consensus. GCI does not oppose several of the refinements to the regulations requested by ACS, MTA, and the Rural Coalition, even on issues where those parties predicted GCI opposition to such changes. However, GCI must clarify certain

¹ Alascom, Inc.

² Alaska Communication Systems

³ Matanuska Telephone Association, Inc.

⁴ GCI Communication Corp. d/b/a General Communication, Inc and d/b/a GCI

1 distortions of the record introduced by MTA and the Rural Coalition to support the
2 proposed refinements.
3

4 GCI does oppose some of the changes proposed by other parties. Most
5 significantly, the Rural Coalition proposed amendments to the regulation on rate
6 rebalancing that would have the effect of selecting the Rural Coalition's approach to
7 rate rebalancing over the case-by-case adjudication favored by the Commission. The
8 Rural Coalition's comments do not include any discussion of their drastic changes,
9 but the amendments' appears in the Rural Coalition's proposed regulatory language.
10

11 It appears that the final regulations adopted in this matter will include virtually
12 all of the provisions that the rural incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) stated
13 that they need in order to respond to competitive entry. Therefore, the ILECs should
14 not then be allowed to also thwart competitive entry, as they are attempting to do in
15 Docket R-05-4. Nor should the Commission consider any new provisions to thwart
16 competitive entry that the ILECs may raise, for the first time, in reply comments.
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18 II. Discussion

19 A. Provisions regarding local exchange markets

20 1. Proposed 220(a) and 299(10), Dominant status in rural markets and the 21 definition of competitive local exchange market.

22 ACS, the Rural Coalition, and MTA each argued that the "shortcut" to non-
23 dominant status in rural areas allowed by 3 AAC 53.220(a) should apply in all areas
24 served by a rural telephone company, regardless of whether or not the rural telephone
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1 company holds a rural exemption. As a practical matter, GCI agrees and GCI does
2 not object to changing "a telephone company holding a rural exemption" to "a rural
3 telephone company as defined by 47 U.S.C. Section 153(37)"⁵
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5 ACS and MTA also each proposed expanding the same "shortcut" to apply
6 when competitive entry takes place by wireless local loop rather than by wireline
7 facilities. Again, GCI agrees. However, GCI would go further and allow the shortcut
8 to apply in the event of any type of competitive, facilities-based entry by a certificated
9 competitor. Thus, the lesser standard for non-dominance would apply if a competitor
10 with some facilities entered primarily using unbundled network elements from the
11 incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC).⁶
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13 Incorporating these two changes, 3 AAC 53.220(1)(1) would read:
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15 (1) in an exchange served by a rural telephone company as defined by
16 47 U.S.C. Section 153(37) and where a second certificated facilities
17 based local exchange carrier offers service to the public.

18 ACS, MTA, and the Rural Coalition also each proposed a modification to 3
19 AAC 53.299(10) so that an area would be deemed a "competitive local exchange
20 market" even if a second certificated carrier is not actually providing service
21 "throughout" the exchange. As explained by their comments, this modification is
22 needed to deal with the situation where GCI's competitive entry may not serve 100%
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25 ⁵ GCI does not believe that it would have been appropriate, at the outset, to apply the lesser standard for non-
dominance in Fairbanks and Juneau. However, current conditions support the treatment of those markets as
nondominant now, so the theoretical harm of bringing those areas within 3 AAC 220(a) is moot.

26 ⁶ According to FCC decisions, a carrier that owns some facilities and also uses UNE's is "facilities based."

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2 of the customers within an exchange area. Once again, GCI agrees that the regulation
3 should be modified to address this situation and that "throughout" is not the proper
4 term.

5 Although GCI agrees that requiring facilities-based competitive service
6 "throughout" the exchange before the market is deemed competitive is overly
7 restrictive, a market should not be deemed competitive upon mere certification.
8 Certification may precede provision of service by a substantial period of time, and
9 some restriction based on the concept of actually being able to provide service to
10 more than a trivial number of customers should be incorporated into the regulation.

11
12 GCI suggests:

13 "Competitive local exchange market" means a local exchange or group
14 of local exchanges within one certificated service area where multiple
15 telecommunications providers are certificated to provide local exchange
16 service and offer to provide local exchange service to at least a
significant portion of the customers in the exchange or group of
exchanges;....

17 This language would **not** require any loss of market share by the incumbent, but
18 would require that a competitive option exist for some significant portion of the
19 market.
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21 GCI's support for this approach is coupled with its proposal in initial
22 comments to protect those customers within the competitive market who do not have
23 a competitive choice. That proposal would prevent the ILEC from targeting such
24 captive customers with rate increases without providing full cost support and, GCI
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1 hopes, that proposal would provide such captive customers with the benefits of
2 competition. Based on their initial comments, MTA and the Rural Coalition appear
3 to agree with that proposal. Both MTA and the Rural Coalition state that they wish to
4 serve the entire exchange with the same tariff, without differentiating between those
5 that have a competitive choice and those that don't. (Rural Coalition Comments, p.
6 14; MTA Comments, p. 9) That is the consistent with the intent of the proposal
7 presented in GCI's initial comments, and it should be made explicit in the regulations.
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10 As should be clear from the foregoing, GCI is not attempting to restrict the
11 ability of any of the rural ILECs to compete against GCI. However, even though GCI
12 accepts the proposed refinements of the proposed regulations, GCI strenuously
13 disagrees with some of the advocacy and distortion of the record presented by other
14 parties.
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16 First, it is absolutely untrue that GCI agreed that under current regulations the
17 Commission has treated GCI and ASC differently for rate decreases and repackaged
18 services, suspending ACS's tariff filings while allowing GCI's filings to go into
19 effect. (ACS Comments, p. 4; MTA Comments, p. 3). GCI has already corrected the
20 Rural Coalitions mis-statement once on this issue.⁷ What GCI said was that the
21 Commission did not allow either carrier's tariff changes to go into effect without
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25 ⁷ The Rural Coalition previously made the same incorrect claim regarding GCI's statements, and GCI has
26 already pointed out the Rural Coalition's misunderstanding. (GCI's Post Hearing Reply Comments, R-03-3, pp.
12-13). Repetition of the distortion a second time goes beyond the bounds of fair and acceptable advocacy.

1 approval, contrary to the intent of the regulations that have previously been in effect
2 in competitive markets.

3
4 Perhaps more importantly, GCI adamantly disagrees with MTA and the Rural
5 Coalition's unsupported statements regarding the severe financial harm that they will
6 suffer from small losses in market share. MTA and the Rural Coalition filed
7 absolutely no supporting analytical or quantitative data. GCI, on the other hand,
8 previously filed quantitative analysis showing that the present access charge and
9 universal service systems provide rural ILECs with significant insulation from the
10 effects of market share loss.⁸ The Rural Coalition offered did not effectively rebut
11 GCI's analysis; its primary point was that GCI had looked at the "total company"
12 rather than just local exchange operations. That criticism is factually correct but
13 logically irrelevant. When evaluating whether market share losses threaten the
14 financial viability of these ILECs, the impact on the total company results is the
15 proper test.

16
17 Furthermore, these ILECs have significant control over the losses that they will
18 incur from competitive entry. The 50% market share loss of ACS in Anchorage
19 frequently cited by the Rural Coalition was the direct result of ACS's 25% rate
20 increase in a competitive market. Other ILECs are not likely to repeat ACS' strategic
21 error.

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25 ⁸ See GCI's Post Hearing Comments, pp. 8-9 and Exhibit A (July 6, 2004). GCI's model showed that a 40%
26 loss in market share by CVTC would cause less than 1% loss in total revenues!

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2 Additionally, these ILECs could also reduce the financial impact of market
3 share losses by voluntarily entering into an agreement to provide GCI unbundled
4 network elements, wholesale resale, and quality service at rates that are more
5 favorable than GCI's cost of providing service over its own facilities.⁹ These ILECs
6 previously testified to the Commission that UNE-based entry is actually better for the
7 ILEC than full facilities based entry because the ILEC continues to receive revenues
8 from UNEs and resale. (Rural Coalition Reply Comments, R-03-3, (February 24,
9 2004)) Those statements were made when the ILECs' focus in R-03-3 was on
10 controlling wireless competition. Now, without explaining the change in their
11 position, the ILECs are fighting UNE-based entry with all the regulatory tools they
12 can muster, forcing GCI to build its own facilities.
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15 Other options are also open to the ILECs. The current ILEC market structure,
16 with approximately 20 different ILECs, each with its own high-paid executives and
17 duplicative staff and operating overhead, is probably not efficient. Consolidation may
18 be appropriate and in the public interest, with or without local exchange competition.
19 The ILECs could save substantial costs, better serve their customers, and better meet
20 competition with such consolidation.
21

22 Ignoring all of these options, the ILECs' comments focus on the possibility of
23 bankruptcy from competition. This "sky is falling" approach is really nothing more
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26 ⁹ Any such agreement would have to be reached before GCI makes investments in facilities based entry.

1 than an attempt to gain sympathy for the ILEC's attempts in Docket U-05-4 to prevent
2 competitive entry in their markets and should be ignored.

3
4 **2. Rural Coalition proposed 3 AAC 53.290(j), return to monopoly**

5 The Rural Coalition continues its campaign of fear by proposing a regulation
6 that would impose all forms of traditional rate of return regulation on any market that
7 returns to being served by a single provider. GCI strongly believes that no markets
8 will return to monopoly status, so the regulation is unnecessary. However, in the
9 unlikely event that a market does return to a single provider, GCI suggests that the
10 Commission address that situation when it occurs. GCI strongly hopes that the
11 Commission will then consider alternatives to the current system of rate base/rate of
12 return regulation with inherently inefficient incentives.

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15 **3. 3 AAC 53.220(c), Services such as access that remain competitive**

16 The Rural Coalition argued that 3 AAC 53.220(c) should be deleted and that
17 non-dominance should include all services, including services such as access service
18 to interexchange carriers. AT&T Alascom, on the other hand, urged continued and
19 even tighter control over access charges, including a return to USOA¹⁰.

20 This issue has been thoroughly discussed in earlier rounds of comments. Two
21 of the services that had previously been on the list to remain regulated were removed,
22 and GCI supports the regulation as now proposed.
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26 ¹⁰ Uniform System of Accounts

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2 In particular as to access charges, GCI notes that the comments of ACS in
3 response to Harbour/Price Question No. 4 are quite similar to the initial comments of
4 GCI. (ACS Comments, Exhibit A, p. 4) Both GCI and ACS noted that, as proposed,
5 access charges will be capped after competitive entry and that full support would be
6 needed to raise the cap, even by a utility otherwise exempt from accounting standards
7 such as the USOA. GCI believes that this approach provides adequate protection
8 against unreasonable access charges, even without increasing regulation by generally
9 re-imposing USOA requirements as proposed by AT&T Alascom.
10

11 GCI also agrees with ACS' comment that the current access charge regime is
12 under federal review in the FCC's "Intercarrier Compensation" proceeding. The
13 current regime is likely to change the access charge regime very significantly, and in
14 ways that assure reasonable access. The regulations as proposed, combined with
15 other regulations and the provisions of the Intrastate Interexchange Access Charge
16 Manual, are adequate to assure that access charges do not increase unreasonably.
17 AT&T Alascom's proposals for further changes regarding access charges are
18 unnecessary.
19

20 **4. 3 AAC 53.243, use of the term "tariff"**
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22 ACS suggests that there is a better term than "tariff" to describe the list of
23 products and prices that a carrier will maintain in a market with no dominant carrier.
24 ACS suggests that the term is not appropriate in the proposed new regulatory regime,
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1 and ACS states that "the Commission can prescribe a new document to be submitted
2 as an informational filing and maintained for public review." (ACS Comments, p. 9)

3
4 GCI partially agrees with ACS that, ideally, "tariff" is not the best word to use
5 in the context of 3 AAC 53.243. However, GCI also believes that, before any other
6 term could be used, the Commission would in fact have to "prescribe a new document
7 to be submitted as an informational filing and maintained for public review." (ACS
8 Comments, p. 9) That would be necessary so that the website available for public
9 review would have all the information that is necessary to be meaningful.
10

11 The problem is that there is not adequate time to prescribe the new document,
12 and selecting an alternative term at this late date would leave the term undefined and
13 subject to controversy. Thus, at this time, GCI supports use of the term "tariff".
14

15 **5. Proposed 3 AAC 53.243(e), Advance Notice to Resellers.**

16 GCI believes that, in large part, this issue has been adequately addressed in
17 prior comments. GCI disagrees with ACS' proposal to now change this regulation,
18 designed to address total service resale, so that it becomes a new, seven day notice
19 requirement by all local carriers to all other local carriers.
20

21 ACS' preferred position is that the issue should be dealt with in the context of
22 interconnection agreements. GCI would accept that solution so long as the
23 Commission includes a regulation providing that any local exchange carrier that
24 provides advance notice to any other local exchange carrier that purchase service at
25 wholesale for resale must provide the same advance notice to all other local exchange
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1 carriers that purchase service at wholesale for resale. In other words, an ILEC should
2 not be allowed to discriminate between its total service resale customers.
3

4 **6. Proposed 3 AAC 53.243(g)(2), special contracts in markets with no dominant**
5 **carrier.**

6 In its comments ACS interprets proposed AAC 53.243(g)(2) as requiring the
7 public filing of all information in order to take advantage of the streamlined process.
8 GCI agrees that the regulation should be interpreted in that way, and GCI suggested
9 language in its initial comments to clarify that interpretation.
10

11 ACS also argued that if the information is to be public, then the entire contract
12 should be filed rather than a summary. In support, ACS cited the administrative
13 convenience of eliminating the need to create a summary.
14

15 GCI partially agrees. GCI suggests that the regulation be amended to allow the
16 alternatives of filing of a summary, as now specified in the proposed regulation, or a
17 copy of the full contract. Adding the alternative of filing the entire contract appears to
18 have no disadvantages, and it would allow carriers to choose that alternative if they
19 desire.
20

21 **7. Proposed 3 AAC 53.243(i), Modification of rates, terms, or conditions of**
22 **service.**

23 ACS proposes to amend proposed 3 AAC 53.243(i) so that the Commission
24 could review rates in markets without a dominant carrier only if a complaint is filed
25 by consumers, another company, or the Regulatory Affairs and Public Advocacy
26

1 section (RAPA). In support of its proposal, ACS cited due process principles and the
2 concept of "separation of powers." The effect of ACS' proposal would prevent the
3 Commission from investigating rates on its own initiative, through its staff.
4

5 Idealistically, GCI is not entirely opposed to ACS' approach. However, GCI
6 observes that ACS' arguments, if accepted, may require more thorough and
7 fundamental changes than a mere amendment of this section. There are numerous
8 instances in the Commission regulation and practice where actions are initiated by the
9 Commission and its staff. Additionally, the approach advocated by ACS would
10 probably require that RAPA have a much larger staff and funding than it does now.
11 Consumers generally lack time and expertise to pursue rate issues on their own.
12

13 Finally, the approach recommended by ACS is not required to avoid due
14 process concerns. The Alaska Supreme Court has specifically recognized that
15 combining investigative and adjudicatory functions in a single administrative agency
16 is legal and not a violation of due process. "That the combination of investigatory and
17 adjudicatory functions in under one agency head is constitutionally permissible is
18 clear" and "a combination of such functions is not a due process violation" *Earth*
19 *Resources Company of Alaska v. State of Alaska, Department of Revenue*, 665 P.2d
20 960, fn. 1 (1983).
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2 **8. 3 AAC 53.290(h), partial waiver of 3 AAC 48.270(a)**

3 Both the Rural Coalition and ACS proposed modifications to 3 AAC
4 53.290(h), which includes a partial waiver of 3 AAC 48.270(a). GCI supports the
5 modification proposed by ACS.

6 The proposed modification of 3 AAC 53.290(h) arose before the Commission
7 proposed de-tariffing in markets with no dominant carrier. Thus, the proposed
8 modification was originally drafted to address the current regulatory framework. The
9 proposed regulation will still work for markets with a dominant carrier, but as ACS
10 suggests it is not appropriate for a market with no dominant carrier regulated under 3
11 AAC 53.243. Accordingly, GCI supports the change to 3 AAC 53.290(h) proposed
12 by ACS on its Exhibit B, p. 24.
13
14

15 **9. Rate Rebalancing**

16 The Rural Coalition's comments on the proposed regulation on rate
17 rebalancing include one page of discussion, followed by three single spaced pages
18 substantially modifying the proposed regulation. The substantive changes in the
19 Rural Coalition's revised regulation, which are not even discussed, have the effect of
20 selecting the Rural Coalition's approach to rate rebalancing over the case-by-case
21 adjudication favored by the Commission.
22

23 GCI agrees with the one change actually discussed and justified in the Rural
24 Coalition's comments, namely that ILECs should be able to file rate rebalancing
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26

1 studies at any time and not just when competition is expected. This change allows
2 time for review without the pressure of an accelerated deadline.
3

4 GCI opposes the other changes proposed by the Rural Coalition that have the
5 effect of selecting the Rural Coalition's approach to rate rebalancing over the case-by-
6 case adjudication favored by the Commission. Rural Coalition's proposed 3 AAC
7 53.245(b)(9) requires the use of company-wide separations factors applied to each
8 noncompetitive exchange. The proposed that use of separations factors is the only
9 way the Rural Coalition can achieve its anti-competitive rate rebalancing objectives,
10 and the proposal is totally contrary to the Rural Coalition's own position that rate
11 rebalancing should treat each exchange as a stand-alone basis to the extent possible.¹¹
12 More importantly, the only evidence on the record on this subject, presented by GCI,
13 clearly shows that using company-wide separations factors deprives the small
14 exchanges of the amount of Universal Service Fund (USF) support that they are due.¹²
15 This proposed change should be rejected.
16

17 Similarly, Rural Coalition's proposed 3 AAC 53.245(b)(6) requires that a rate
18 rebalancing study be based on the existing USF disaggregation plan, locking in the
19 current flawed plans that create the need for rate rebalancing. Again, the Rural
20 Coalition is attempting to get the Commission to adopt its own rate rebalancing
21 approach, without discussion or support. Proposed 3 AAC 53.245(b)(6) is also
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25 ¹¹ See Rural Coalition Post-Workshop Comments, R-03-3, pp 26, 28, 30, and fns. 23, 24, 25.

26 ¹² See GCI's Post-Workshop Reply Comments, pp. 6-8 and Appendix (March 14, 2005)

1 inconsistent with proposed 3 AAC 53.245(b)(7), which requires consideration of
2 alternative disaggregation plans as an alternative to rate rebalancing.
3

4 Finally, and again without discussion, the Rural Coalition's proposal would
5 include a requirement that rate rebalancing would result in a new, mini-postage stamp
6 rate area for non-competitive exchanges, rather than individual rates for each
7 exchange. The regulations, as proposed by the Commission, are silent on that
8 question, allowing the issue to be decided on a case by case approach.
9

10 This Rural Coalition proposal should not be adopted. That approach would
11 guarantee the need for additional rate rebalancing each time a new exchange become
12 competitive, which is sure to happen if the Rural Coalition succeeds in its efforts to
13 raise the rates in non-competitive areas. The Commission should retain the current,
14 case by case approach.
15

16 GCI also objects to the Rural Coalition's continued inclusion of proposed 3
17 AAC 53.245(g), which provides that a rate rebalancing proposal can be filed in an
18 docket relating to a certificate application to aid in the consideration of the public
19 interest. The Telecommunications Act prohibits "public interest" considerations as a
20 bar to competitive entry. "...Congress demonstrated its intent to open all markets to
21 potential competitors—even markets served by rural or small LECs that may qualify
22 for interconnection relief." *In the Matter of Silver Star Telephone Company, Inc.,*
23 *Petition for Preemption and Declaratory Ruling, Memorandum Opinion and Order,*
24 *FCC 97-336, 12 FCC Rcd. 15639, 15659 (September 24, 1997).* During the nearly 2
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1
2 year history of this proceeding no party has ever objected to GCI's proposal to amend
3 AAC 53.210 to allow competitive entry in all local markets, even markets without
4 existing competition, using an abbreviated application form without any
5 demonstration of the public interest. GCI's proposed amendment is included in the
6 Commission's proposed regulations.

7
8 The Rural Coalition's proposal to include proposed 3 AAC 53.245(g),
9 implying that a public interest standard applies to certificate application, should be
10 rejected. Federal law prohibits the application of a general public interest standard to
11 application for a certificate for competitive entry. Section 253 of the
12 Telecommunications Act of 1996, which is titled "Removal of Barriers to Entry",
13 prohibits the application of a public interest test to an application to provide
14 telecommunications service.

15
16 Section 253 states a rule that no requirement may prohibit or have the effect of
17 prohibiting any carrier to provide any telecommunications service. 47 USC 253(a).
18 Section 253 then allows a limited exception to the rule for rural markets, namely that
19 state Commissions can require a new entrant into a rural market to provide and
20 advertise service throughout the ILEC's study area if the new entrant has the benefit
21 of "wholesale resale" from the ILEC under Section 251(c)(4). In short, there can be
22 no barriers to entry, but the Commission can require a new entrant to serve throughout
23 a rural ILEC's service areas unless the rural ILEC has a rural exemption that prevents
24 the new entrant from using wholesale resale in order to serve throughout the area.

1
2 It is very instructive to note what the rural market exception to the general rule
3 prohibiting barriers to entry does not do. The rural market exception is written by
4 referring to Section 214(e)(1), which concerns the service obligation of ETCs¹³. The
5 exception specifically does not refer to Section 214(e)(2), which states that an
6 additional ETC can be designated in a rural study area only if the commission finds
7 that the additional ETC designation is in the public interest. 47 USC Section
8 214(e)(2). In other words, for rural markets Congress specifically chose to allow
9 imposition of one ETC standard, service throughout the service area, but not to allow
10 imposition of another ETC standard, the public interest test, as a limitation on
11 competitive entry.¹⁴ The unmistakable conclusion is that the "Removal of barriers to
12 entry" standard adopted by Congress prohibits the imposition of a public interest test
13 as a criteria for new entry.
14

15
16 The Federal Communications Commission explicitly affirmed this
17 interpretation of Section 253 in *Silver Star*. That case involved an application by
18 Silver Star to provide competitive local exchange service to a small rural exchange
19 area in Wyoming with approximately 2336 access lines. Silver Star's application for
20 a CPCN was denied by the Wyoming Commission based on a state statute that
21 allowed the incumbent to block entry for a period of time. The stated purpose of the
22 Wyoming statute, included in Legislative Intent, was "to ensure essential
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24
25 ¹³ Eligible Telecommunications Carriers

26 ¹⁴ But again, even the "service throughout the service area" restriction cannot be imposed if the new entrant
27 does not have access to wholesale resale of the ILEC's services.

1 telecommunications services are universally available to the citizens of this state
2 while encouraging the development of new infrastructure, facilities, products and
3 services.... It is the intent of this act to provide a transition from rate of return
4 regulation of a monopolistic telecommunications industry to competitive markets and
5 to maintain affordable essential telecommunications services throughout the
6 transitions period.” (*Silver Star* at 15646). In that case the FCC preempted that
7 Wyoming statute and the Wyoming Commission, specifically ruling that denial of
8 competitive entry based on public interest type considerations such as those set forth
9 in the Legislative Intent was prohibited by Section 253(a). The FCC explained that
10 Congress chose to provide limited protections for rural markets, including Section
11 253(f) permitting a requirement for service throughout an area and Section 214(e)(2)
12 requiring a public interest determination for designation of a second ETC, but did not
13 allow denial of entry: “These accommodations [253(f) and 214(e)(2)] to the unique
14 circumstances of rural telephone companies, like those in section 251(f), indicate that
15 Congress did not contemplate that States could “protect” rural telephone companies
16 with the much more competitively restrictive method of a categorical ban on entry.”
17 *Silver Star* at 15959. The FCC further stated that “By granting rural and small LECs
18 relief from the interconnection obligations instead of an outright prohibition on
19 competition, however, Congress demonstrated its intent to open all markets to
20 potential competitors—even markets served by rural or small LECs that may qualify
21 for interconnection relief.” (*Id* at 15659.)
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2 This Commission has also affirmed—twice--that the Telecommunications Act
3 does not allow the consideration of such public interest issue when judging an
4 application for competitive entry. In Docket U-01-109, KPU requested a public
5 hearing to test whether local competition is in the public interest, and the Commission
6 ruled that “the Telecommunications Act precludes us from denying a certificate
7 application for the reasons that KPU would like to demonstrate through evidence at a
8 hearing.” (Order U-01-109(3), p. 5.) This Commission affirmed that decision on
9 reconsideration. (Order U-01-109(4)).
10

11 Thus, the Telecommunications Act, as confirmed by decisions of the FCC,
12 demonstrates that an application for competitive entry cannot be denied based on
13 alleged “public interest” concerns. The provision in proposed 3 AAC 53.245(g) that
14 would insert a public interest test into an application for a certificate is contrary to law
15 and should be rejected.
16

17 **B. Provisions for Interexchange Markets**

18 **1. Market Competitiveness**

19 ACS once again questions whether the interexchange market is competitive,
20 contradicting prior advocacy and ignoring obvious market characteristics such as
21 market shares and prices at or below cost. In this instance ACS alleges
22 anticompetitive conduct by GCI involving a grant funding of the Alaska
23 Telecommunications Users Consortium (ATUC).
24

1 ACS' is wrong. GCI commented on the ATUC proposal because GCI opposes
2 government funding of one competitor in an existing, competitive market where other
3 competitors are funded with private capital. Such government-subsidization of a
4 single competitor is, as even ACS recognizes, undesirable. (ACS Comments, p. 5)
5 The difference between ACS and GCI is that ACS concluded in this instance that
6 ATUC did not intend to become a competitor, while GCI concluded that was exactly
7 ATUC's intent. The Denali Commission, the agency in charge of this grant,
8 apparently agreed with GCI and not ACS.¹⁵

11 In its redraft of proposed regulations, Exhibit B, ACS proposes in several
12 instances to add language allowing review of rates "that may have been set on any
13 basis other than an application of market forces." (ACS Exhibit B, p. 9, 10) GCI
14 understands that ACS proposes this language based on its allegations of
15 anticompetitive conduct.

17 GCI opposes the specific language proposed by ACS because it is extremely
18 vague. However, GCI is pleased that ACS has apparently abandoned its contention
19 that the Commission cannot consider antitrust considerations when it evaluates rates,
20 and GCI would not object to more appropriate language to incorporate antitrust
21 considerations.

24 ¹⁵ GCI has not and does not oppose entry into its markets by other competitors. GCI did not oppose MTA's
25 entry into the cable television market. Nor did GCI oppose KPU's entry into that market, GCI only asked that
26 the Commission also take steps to make the local market competitive at the same time. GCI has not opposed
competitive long distance entry or further local exchange entry by other entities

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2 **2. Proposed 3 AAC 52.375, Wholesale Services**

3 AT&T Alascom proposed an amendment to proposed 3 AAC 52.375,
4 Wholesale Services. The primary purpose of the amendment is to change the filing
5 requirements for wholesale rate increases, eliminating requirements that are not
6 applicable to rates determined based on incremental and embedded direct, rather than
7 rate based/rate of return, methodologies. AT&T Alascom's proposals are consistent
8 with the initial comments of GCI and GCI urges that they be adopted.
9

10 **3. Carrier of Last Resort Obligations**

11 AT&T Alascom complains that the proposed regulations now place
12 requirement on it, as the carrier of last resort (COLR), that are actually only
13 appropriate for a dominant carrier. AT&T Alascom cites the fact that the
14 requirements, as they currently exist, apply to dominant carriers, not the carrier of last
15 resort.
16

17 GCI takes no position as to whether any particular requirement can be or
18 should be imposed on AT&T Alascom as COLR. GCI does disagree, however, with
19 some of the arguments presented by AT&T Alascom.

20
21 There is an inherent flaw in AT&T Alascom's argument that any requirement
22 in the current regulation that applies based on a dominant status applies only because
23 of that status and not because of carrier of last resort status. The flaw is that under
24 current regulations "dominant carrier" equals "carrier of last resort". "A dominant
25 carrier is responsible for providing intrastate interexchange telephone service as the
26

1 carrier of last resort.” 3 AAC 52.390(2) Therefore, there was little need for the
2 Commission to carefully distinguish between the two concepts when it previously
3 adopted regulations.
4

5 This can be best seen in the current version of 3 AAC 52.365. That section
6 establishes a lesser standard for discontinuance, suspension, or abandonment of
7 service by a nondominant, but not a dominant, carrier. It seems obvious that
8 abandonment of service is a carrier of last resort concept, but the current regulations
9 address the concept in terms of dominant/nondominant requirements.
10

11 GCI also notes its doubts regarding AT&T’s statistic that it now has a market
12 share of only 42 percent. This low market share percentage appears to be the result of
13 AT&T Alascom’s continuing inability to accurately report all of the minutes
14 associated with Alaska to Alaska debit card traffic.
15

16 III. Conclusion

17 As noted at the outset, relatively few significant issues remain to be resolved in
18 this Docket. GCI’s appreciates the Commission’s diligent efforts.

19 The regulations ultimately adopted in this matter will provide incumbent
20 carriers virtually all the tools that they requested to enable them to face competitive
21 entry. The regulations will more than fulfill every principle and standard in HB 111
22 regarding treatment of incumbents.
23

24 Almost lost in this Docket, however, are the provisions of HB 111 clearly
25 favoring the competitive providing of all telecommunications services. HB 111 also
26

1 states that "competition among telecommunications companies shall be encouraged."
2
3 HB111(b)(4). There is only one provision in the regulations that encourages
4 competition, and that is the amendment to 3 AAC 53.210 that simplifies the
5 application process for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.

6 Thus, with the final adoption of regulations establishing a revised market
7 structure for competitive local markets, it will also be time to truly fulfill the intent of
8 HB 111 by granting applications to provide competitive local exchange service and
9 allowing competition to begin.
10

11
12 **DATED** at Anchorage, Alaska this 19th day of May, 2005.


13 GENERAL COMMUNICATION, INC.

14
15 BY: 
16 James R. Jackson

17 Its: Regulatory Attorney
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
VERIFICATION

I, James R. Jackson, verify that I believe the statements contained in this pleading are true and accurate.


James R. Jackson

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of May,
2005.




Notary Public in and for Alaska
My commission expires: May 19, 2006